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Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa in the England 
and Wales Court of Protection 
Emma Cave, Professor in Healthcare Law, Durham University, Durham Law School. 
Jacinta Tan, Associate Professor (Clinical), Swansea University Medical School. 
This is a pre-edited version of an article accepted for publication in the International Journal 
of Mental Health and Capacity Law 2017. This is an open access journal and the definitive 
version can be downloaded from:  
http://www.northumbriajournals.co.uk/index.php/IJMHMCL/index  
Abstract 
This article explores legal issues relating to the continuation of in-patient treatment for some 
patients with severe Anorexia Nervosa, in circumstances where there are doubts as to whether 
such treatment would be effective. In five recent cases, the Court of Protection in England 
and Wales has been asked to consider the capacity and best interests of patients with severe 
and enduring Anorexia Nervosa. Drawing on international comparisons, this article outlines 
clinical uncertainties over prognosis and treatment in light of which legal assertions of 
capacity and best interests are evaluated. To ensure that palliative management is based on 
need rather than diagnosis; and that capacity is decision- and not disease-specific, a closer 
alignment is required between the focus of the capacity and the best interests assessments. 
Three specific recommendations are put forward: (1) The courts should take a patient-centred 
rather than clinician-centred approach to framing the decision that is subject to a capacity 
assessment. (2) Where a patient with Anorexia Nervosa lacks capacity, reliance on their 
stated treatment preferences must be balanced with their views and hopes regarding 
prognosis. The value of different treatment options should be assessed in this light. (3) Given 
clinical and ethical uncertainty on prognosis and appropriateness of treatment, there are 
dangers in relying on the same court-appointed expert in all cases.  
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Introduction 
In England and Wales, section 1(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires that where a 
person lacks capacity, decisions made on their behalf must be in their best interests. Section 4 
sets out factors that must be considered and whilst there is no hierarchy, the facts of the case 
will determine that some factors have particular weight. The UK Supreme Court decision of 
Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James (Aintree) established that best 
interests must be determined from the perspective of the person who lacks capacity.
1
 
Notwithstanding this development, the Law Commission reported in 2017 that the law 
insufficiently prioritises the person’s wishes and feelings.2 Decision-makers should not 
merely ‘consider’ wishes and feelings, but should ‘ascertain’ them as far as is practicable and 
give them weight, departing from them only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.
3
  
In this paper it is argued that medical developments surrounding what has recently been 
recognised as ‘severe and enduring’ Anorexia Nervosa (referred to in this paper by the 
acronym SEAN)
4
 pose a number of challenges to a patient-centred approach. This paper 
suggests ways in which they might be addressed at common law, measures that would be 
supported and advanced if the Law Commission’s proposals for reform of the best interest 
test come to fruition. There is growing recognition that treatment of SEAN can in some cases 
be considered futile,
5
 in which case there is no legal basis to impose it on patients who cannot 
or will not consent. Patients with SEAN do not have a disorder of consciousness and can 
usually articulate their current views. This paper considers what reliance should be placed on 
those views both in determining whether a patient with SEAN (who will be called ‘P’ in this 
paper) has capacity and, where capacity is lacking, assessing P’s best interests.  
The article begins by exploring medical advancements in relation to Anorexia Nervosa, 
before examining a series of five recent cases in which the respective judges made 
compassionate evaluations of whether compulsory treatment of patients with SEAN and other 
conditions should continue. The cases were heard in the Court of Protection, which sits in 
London and has jurisdiction over financial and welfare maters for people who lack mental 
capacity. There follows an analysis of capacity, best interests and futility, and a proposal for 
                                                 
1
 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [45]. 
2
 Law Commission. 2017. Mental capacity and deprivation of liberty. Law Com No 372, 14.7. 
3
 Ibid 14.16 – 14.18 and rec 40; Draft Bill, cl 8(2) and (3). 
4
 A term used in Mitchison, D, Hay P, Engel S, Crosby R et al. 2013. Assessment of quality of life in people 
with severe and enduring anorexia nervosa: a comparison of generic and specific instruments. BMC Psychiatry. 
13: 1-9. Also referred to as SEED-AN: see Robinson PH, Kukucska R, Guidetti G, Leavey G. 2015. Severe and 
enduring anorexia nervosa (SEED-AN): a qualitative study of patients with 20+ years of anorexia nervosa. 
European Eating Disorders Review Jul;23(4): 318-26.  
5
 Westmoreland P, Mehler PS. 2016. Caring for Patients with Severe and Enduring Eating Disorders (SEED): 
Certification, Harm Reduction, Palliative Care, and the Question of Futility. Journal of Psychiatric Practice 
Jul;22(4): 313-20. 
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greater alignment of the capacity and best interests assessments. The authors respectfully 
make three recommendations for future cases. Though focussed on the Court of Protection, 
the recommendations flow from an analysis of universal principles of human rights and have 
resonance for international jurisdictions:  
(1) The courts should take a patient-centred rather than clinician-centred approach to framing 
the decision that is subject to a capacity assessment. Whilst Anorexia Nervosa sometimes 
affects decision-making capacity in relation to nutrition, the does not preclude a finding that 
the patient has capacity regarding end of life decisions.  
(2) Where a patient with Anorexia Nervosa lacks capacity, reliance on their stated treatment 
preferences must be balanced with their views and hopes regarding prognosis. The value of 
treatment options should be assessed in this light.  
(3) Given clinical and ethical uncertainty on prognosis and appropriateness of treatment, 
courts should appoint experts from a wider pool. There are dangers of relying on the same 
appointed expert in all cases.  
Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa 
Anorexia Nervosa is a serious and potentially life threatening mental health condition. Whilst 
it typically affects adolescents, it can also affect people into middle age,
6
 and, whilst many 
people who have Anorexia Nervosa are female, it also affects men. Voluntary treatment on an 
outpatient basis is often effective, but more serious cases may be referred to and treated by 
specialist eating disorder clinics and some of these people require hospitalisation. The 2017 
draft National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidance reports wide 
variation in the treatment and management of eating disorders in the NHS.
7
 There are chronic 
bed shortages
8
 and patients are not always admitted to the appropriate treatment setting.
9
  
                                                 
6
 Micali, N, Martini MG, Thomas JJ et al. 2017. Lifetime and 12-month prevalence of eating disorders amongst 
women in mid-life: a population-based study of diagnoses and risk factors. BMC Medicine [Online] 15:12. See 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12916-016-0766-4. 
7
 National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. Eating disorders - recognition and treatment. In 
development [GID-CGWAVE0703]. Expected publication date: May 2017, 2.9. 
8
 See for example National Health Executive. 2016. National bed shortages force English anorexia patients to 
Scotland for care. 12th December. See http://www.nationalhealthexecutive.com/Health-Care-News/bed-
shortages-force-english-anorexia-patients-to-scotland-for-care. And see proposals to tackle out-of-area 
placements for children and young people in Mental Health Taskforce. 2016. Five Year Forward View for 
Mental Health. See https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Mental-Health-Taskforce-FYFV-
final.pdf. 
9
 The Royal Colleges of Psychiatrists, 2014. Physicians and Pathologists. MARSIPAN: Management of Really 
Sick Patients with Anorexia Nervosa. 2
nd
 Edn. CR189, p 6. See 
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/CR189.pdf.  
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Where P’s health or survival is threatened, P may be detained under sections 2 or 3 of the 
Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA). Section 63 of the MHA allows medical treatment for the 
disorder, without consent, including artificial nutrition.
10
 The most straightforward and 
common method of refeeding a patient is with a gradually increasing number of calories in an 
oral diet under supervision. For most patients, the requirement and expectation to eat, 
especially under the MHA, is sufficient. However, a small proportion of patients are unable 
to eat normally and require tube feeding. Tube feeding is medically invasive and carries its 
own risks, such as accidental feeding into the lung. Tube feeding is sometimes acceptable to, 
or even preferred or welcomed by, patients with Anorexia Nervosa, as it limits choice and the 
burden of responsibility by bypassing the physical act of eating.
11
 For others, however, there 
can be efforts to refuse, manipulate or remove the tubes, which is dangerous. If resistance is 
sustained, this can lead to increasing conflict and restraint which can then raise the spectre of 
forced feeding under physical restraint or pharmacological sedation.  
Refeeding through any means can lead to complications. Sustained malnutrition leads to 
deficiencies of both macronutrients (such as carbohydrates and protein) and micronutrients 
(such as vitamins and minerals). Refeeding rapidly by any means without proper medical 
supervision can lead to potentially life-threatening metabolic changes, such as ‘re-feeding 
syndrome'.
12
 Medical opinion differs as to the acceptability and efficacy of tube feeding in 
voluntary patients. NICE advises that feeding against the will of a patient (ie, when the 
patient resists) is an option of last resort.
13
 In patients with severe Anorexia Nervosa, non-oral 
nutrition under a variety of degrees of compulsion may be the only option to maintain life. 
Naso-gastric tubes can be passed through the nose into the stomach; this is the commonest 
form of tube feeding but is only recommended for short periods. There are other forms of 
tube feeding such as Percutaneous Endoscopic Gastrostomy (PEG) feeding where a tube is 
surgically inserted into the stomach; or intravenous nutrition. 
Eating disorders have the highest mortality rate of psychiatric disorders.
14
 Guidance from the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists
15
 focuses on reducing fatal outcomes, recognising that they 
                                                 
10
 B v Croydon District HA (1992) 22 BMLR 13, CA; Re KB (adult) (mental patient: medical treatment) (1994) 
19 BMLR 144; Riverside Health NHS Trust v Fox [1994] 1 FLR 614; MCA Code of Practice 9.26. 
11
 See Tan J, Stewart A, Fitzpatrick R, & Hope T. 2010. Attitudes of patients with anorexia nervosa to 
compulsory treatment and coercion. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33(1): 13-19. 
12
 NICE. Nutrition support in adults. Clinical guideline CG32. 2006. 
13
 NICE. Eating disorders: core interventions in the treatment and management of anorexia nervosa, bulimia 
nervosa and related eating disorders. Clinical Guideline CG 9. 2004, 1.2.4.10-11. 
14
 Arcelus J, Mitchell AJ, Wales J et al. 2011. Mortality rates in patients with Anorexia Nervosa and other eating 
disorders: A Meta Analysis of 36 Studies. Archives of General Psychiatry. 68: 724-31. 
15
 Royal College of Psychiatrists. 2014. Management of Really Sick Patients with Anorexia Nervosa’ 
(MARSIPAN) CR198. And see Junior MARSIPAN: Management of Really Sick Patients under 18 with 
Anorexia Nervosa. CR168. 
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sometimes result from ‘inappropriate palliative care’.16 In 1997 the media reported the death 
of Nikki Hughes who had Anorexia Nervosa, stating that the Trust treating her was given 
legal advice that her refusal of treatment could not be overridden.
17
 The MHA Commission 
issued guidance to the contrary,
18
 but reports of underfunding and confusion about the legal 
position persist.
19
 Some patients are not given access to the right support at the right time. It 
is noteworthy that neither the current
20
 nor the new draft NICE guidance
21
 comments on the 
relevance of palliative management of Anorexia Nervosa, the emphasis being on timely and 
consistent treatment. As we shall see, future guidance may need to respond to developments 
in the classification of Anorexia Nervosa that could lead to a growing acceptance of palliative 
management in the most severe and enduring cases.  
Full recovery occurs in around 50% of patients who have Anorexia Nervosa.
22
 The term 
‘Severe and Enduring’ has traditionally been reserved for certain psychotic conditions, but 
more recently has been applied so as to describe a classification of Anorexia Nervosa.
23
 
SEAN is amongst the most challenging mental health conditions to treat.
24
 Though 
approaches and treatments for Anorexia Nervosa are constantly evolving,
25
 the prognosis for 
                                                 
16
 Ibid, p 30. 
17
 See Cooper G. 1997. Doctors get right to force-feed anorexic patients. The Independent. 5 August. 
18
 Mental Health Act Commission. 2004. Guidance on the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa under the Mental 
Health Act 1983. See http://www.seedeatingdisorders.org.uk/pdfs/user/F3774357-49CE-5BCB-F9BB-
22ECC4C430E5.pdf.  
19
 See The Masked AMHP. 2010. Anorexia, the Mental Health Act – and Kayleigh. See 
http://themaskedamhp.blogspot.co.uk/2010/12/anorexia-mental-health-act-and-kayleigh.html; BBC News. 2004. 
Anorexia death to be investigated. 4 February: See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3460189.stm; Daily Mail. 
2010. ‘Skeletal’ male chef suffering from anorexia and bulimia died while on daily diet of just two 
crackerbreads. 29 June: See http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1290635/Skeletal-male-chef-suffering-
anorexia-bulimia-died-daily-diet-just-crackerbreads.html; Tyler J. 2016. Eating disorders nurse died weighing 
5st after using her know-how to hide her own anorexia. Birmingham Mail, 24 October: See 
http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/eating-disorders-nurse-died-weighing-12072468; BBC 
News. 2017. Anorexic woman's death 'would have been prevented' with better treatment. 2 February. See 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-38825643. 
20
 NICE. Eating disorders: core interventions in the treatment and management of anorexia nervosa, bulimia 
nervosa and related eating disorders. Clinical Guideline CG 9. 2004. 
21
 NICE. Eating disorders - recognition and treatment. In development [GID-CGWAVE0703]. Expected 
publication date: May 2017. 
22
 Foppiani L, Massobrio B, Cascio C, Antonucci G. 2017. Near-fatal Anorexia Nervosa in a Middle-aged 
Woman. Intern Med. 5693: 327-334. 
23
 Hay PI, Touyz S. 2015. Treatment of patients with severe and enduring eating disorders. Current Opinion in 
Psychiatry. Nov;28(6): 473-7. 
24
 Steinhausen HC. 2002. The outcome of anorexia nervosa in the 20
th
 century. American Journal of Psychiatry 
159:1284-93. 
25
 See for example Nicolaidis S. 2017. Neurosurgery of the future: Deep brain stimulations and manipulations. 
Metabolism. Jan 11. doi: 10.1016/j.metabol.2017.01.013. [Epub ahead of print]. 
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patients with SEAN is under-researched.
26
 If widely accepted, the reclassification of 
Anorexia Nervosa may lead to improvements in the recognition, research and support of 
severe cases.
27
 As such it is a welcome development, but careful exploration is needed to 
determine whether ‘staging’ of Anorexia Nervosa might or should lead to a greater 
acceptance of the withdrawal of active treatment in favour of purely palliative management 
of SEAN.
28
 Questions around the suitability of palliative management in severe Anorexia 
Nervosa are not new,
29
 but its use has traditionally been determined by need rather than 
diagnosis. More recently, there have been calls for palliative management of cases lasting 
more than ten years,
30
 but a recent longitudinal study found that around half of those who had 
not recovered from Anorexia Nervosa at 9 years, had recovered at 22 years.
31
 From a clinical 
perspective at least, the study indicates that routine palliative management of SEAN is 
inappropriate.
32
 It also raises questions around the ongoing treatment of the third of patients 
studied who were not recovered at 22 years. There is little data on treatment efficacy in such 
cases. Nor is it clear that clinicians can distinguish the longstanding patients who eventually 
recover from those who will not. Some argue that treatment should endure as long as it is not 
rendered unviable by co-morbidities
33
 and others argue that SEAN can be a terminal 
condition in which case palliative management is appropriate.
34
 Compulsory treatment 
                                                 
26
 Hay PJ, Touyz S, Sud R. 2012. Treatment for severe and enduring anorexia nervosa: a review. Aust N Z J 
Psychiatry. 46: 1136–44. And see Touyz S, Le Grange D, Hay P, Lacey H (Eds). 2016. Managing Severe and 
Enduring Anorexia Nervosa: A Clinician's Guide. London: Taylor and Francis. 
27
 Touyz S, Hay P. 2015. Severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SE-AN): in search of a new paradigm. Journal 
of Eating Disorders. 3: 26. 
28
 Treasure J, Stein D & Maguire S. 2015. Has the time come for a staging model to map the course of eating 
disorders from high risk to severe enduring illness? An examination of the evidence. Early Intervention in 
Psychiatry. 9: 173–184. 
29
 Williams CJ. 1998. Does palliative care have a role in treatment of anorexia nervosa? BMJ 18; 317(7152): 
195–197. 
30
 See Steinhausen HC. 2002. The outcome of anorexia nervosa in the 20th century. American Journal of 
Psychiatry 159:1284-93. 
31
 Eddy KT, Tabri N, Thomas JJ, et al. 2016. Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa at 22-Year 
follow-up. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry. 2016 Dec 20. doi: 10.4088/JCP.15m10393: 31.4% of anorectic 
patients recovered in 9 years and 62.8% in 22 years. 
32
 The study focussed on patients with DSM-III-R/DSM-IV anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa. 
33
 Collins Lyster-Mench L. 2016. There is no such thing as ‘late terminal anorexia-nervosa’. Huffington Post. 12 
August. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/there-is-no-such-thing-as-late-terminal-anorexia-
nervosa_us_5849c4e9e4b07d4bc0fa2605.  
34
 See Schmidt S. 2016. Anorexic woman weighing 69 pounds has a right to starve, court rules. Washington 
Post. 22 November: See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/22/anorexic-woman-
weighing-69-pounds-has-a-right-to-starve-court-rules/?utm_term=.08d50a6ef4ca, discussed below. AG was said 
to have ‘late terminal anorexia nervosa’. 
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against P’s wishes can thus be viewed as an ethical imperative or ethically unjustifiable 
depending on the viewpoint.  
Moves to reclassify some cases of SEAN as terminal, are influenced by human rights 
developments protecting rights to individual autonomy and freedom from discrimination. The 
five cases discussed below each referred to the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
jurisprudence of which is influenced by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2006 (CRPD), though disappointingly the cases do not expressly reference the 
CRPD. The CRPD prohibits discrimination based on disability (article 4); states that the 
existence of disability does not justify deprivation of liberty (article 14); and protects the 
rights of persons with disability to ‘enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life’ (article 12). Though the UK ratified the Convention in 2009, it remains 
unincorporated in English law, and it clashes with aspects of the MHA 1983 and the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, that apply in England and Wales.
35
 The paternalistic ‘compassionate 
intervention’ model36 that sanctions compulsory re-feeding for the good of the patient gained 
credence on the basis of evidence that many patients who were coerced are later grateful for 
the intervention.
37
 This model is losing force.
38
 The latest NICE guidance charts a withdrawal 
of ‘moral authority’ for compulsory re-feeding and the dawn of a ‘more lenient approach’.39 
This development is not restricted to eating disorders. Consider recent proclamations that 
mental health units should supply sterile cutting equipment to some patients who self-harm 
on the basis that compulsion can exacerbate the problem. Sullivan argues for a harm 
minimisation model that recognises the value of supporting autonomy and independence.
40
 
As in cases of SEAN, the tensions are multi-faceted. Clinicians must balance the patient’s 
preferences against their insight into the condition; the value of independence and control 
against compulsion; long-term against short-term harm minimisation; and management 
against cure. A plurality of views exists as to the prognosis and treatment options of patients 
with SEAN and yet in the five cases discussed in the next section, the Court called each time 
                                                 
35
 See Szmukler G, Daw R, Callard F. 2014. Mental health law and the UN Convention on the rights of persons 
with disabilities. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry. 37(3): 245-252. 
36
 Faith KE. 2002. Addressing Issues of Autonomy and Beneficence in the Treatment of Eating Disorders. 
National Eating Disorder Information Centre. See http://nedic.ca/sites/default/files/addressing-issues-
beneficience-and-autonomy-treatment-eating-disorders.pdf.  
37
 Watson T, Bowers W and Anderson A. 2000. Involuntary Treatment of Eating Disorders. American Journal 
of Psychiatry. 157: 1806-1810.  
38
 Law Commission. 2017. Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty. Law Com No 372, 13.18. 
39
 NICE. Eating Disorders - Recognition and Treatment. In development [GID-CGWAVE0703]. Expected 
publication date: May 2017, p 31. 
40
 Sullivan PJ. 2017. Should healthcare professionals sometimes allow harm? The case of self-injury. Journal of 
Medical Ethics. Published Online First: 09 February 2017. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2015-103146. Contrast 
Pickard H, Pearce S. 2017. Balancing costs and benefits: a clinical perspective does not support a harm 
minimisation approach for self-injury outside of community settings. Journal of Medical Ethics. Published 
Online First: 09 February 2017. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2017-104152. 
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on the specialist advice of the same expert: Dr Tyrone Glover. Whilst there is nothing 
whatsoever to suggest that this advice was not of the highest quality and integrity, it is 
respectfully submitted that the Court would benefit from consideration of a broader range of 
clinical viewpoints. 
The cases 
All of the five cases involved female patients over the age of 18
41
 who had suffered from 
Anorexia Nervosa for more than 14 years.
42
 In each case, a determination of the patients’ best 
interests was made on the basis that they lacked capacity to decide.  
Only in Re E did the court decide that in-patient treatment should continue. This was also the 
only case in which the judge referred to the term ‘withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment’.43 
The emotive language supported the decision to continue treatment and its avoidance in L, X, 
W, and Z’s cases arguably had the opposite effect. Nonetheless, none of the judges avoided 
the reality that they were in effect choosing between end of life options.
44
  
In the cases of L, X, W and Z, declarations were granted to the respective Trusts allowing in-
patient treatment to be withdrawn. The judges felt that there was no available treatment that 
offered a realistic prospect of significantly extending the patients’ lifespans.45 It was in each 
patient’s best interests to be discharged from the MHA framework46 in the hope that P would 
engage in voluntary treatment. Because that hope was negligible, the judges focussed on the 
inefficacy of continued compulsory treatment, considering the significant psychological and 
physical burdens it would entail. The patients were likely to resist re-feeding by naso-gastric 
tube, so that restraint would be required. In each case the judge recognised that the decision 
was in all likelihood life-limiting.
47
 Taking each case in turn:  
                                                 
41
 E was 32; L was 29; X a ‘young woman’; W was 28; and Z was 46. 
42
 E for 21 years; L for 15 years, X for 14, W for 20 and Z for 31 years. 
43
 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [5]. Hereafter Re E. 
44
 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [52]; A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official 
Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [44]; Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, [54]; Cheshire & 
Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016] EWCOP 56, [11]. Hereafter Re L, Re X, Re W, Re Z. 
45
 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [1], [7] per Eleanor King J; A NHS Foundation 
Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [43] per Cobb J; Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) 
[2016] EWCOP 13, [49] per Peter Jackson J; Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016] EWCOP 56 [9] per 
Hayden J. 
46
 The procedural issues this raises are beyond the scope of this article but see Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT 
v Z [2016] EWCOP 56, [21] per Hayden J.  
47
 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [52] per Eleanor King J; A NHS Foundation Trust 
v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [44] per Cobb J; Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016] 
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Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012]
48
 
E was being treated in a palliative care setting, as previous treatment attempts had failed to 
affect a cure. The Official Solicitor and local authority sought a declaration that E be moved 
to an intensive care unit for re-feeding. E’s parents disagreed, arguing that palliative 
management was what E wanted. Peter Jackson J held that E lacked capacity to make 
decisions about life-sustaining treatment and that it was in her best interests to be forcibly re-
fed. The 20-30%
49
 chance of a full recovery that a 12-month (plus) programme of treatment 
might bring, justified any violation of her rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. There was still hope for E:  
We only live once – we are born once and we die once – and the difference between 
life and death is the biggest difference we know. E is a special person, whose life is of 
value. She does not see it that way now, but she may in future.
50
 
Sadly, there was evidence in Re E that E took pride in being ‘the most treatment-resistant 
patient they had ever had’.51 In Re X it was noted that, two years on, E was still receiving 
treatment as an in-patient.
52
 
E had twice made advance decisions refusing re-feeding. Validity is subject to evidence that 
the maker had capacity at the relevant time. A doctor had opined that E had the requisite 
capacity, but soon after felt that E was not expressing a consistent wish to die. In an apparent 
reversal of the burden of proof, Peter Jackson J concluded that, on the balance of 
probabilities, E lacked capacity at the time she signed the advance decision.
53
  
Re E differs from the other four cases in its manner of presentation to the court. In Re E the 
Official Solicitor proposed continued treatment whereas in the other cases, the request was 
specifically about withdrawal of compulsory in-patient treatment. The open-endedness of the 
application in Re E did not go unnoticed. Peter Jackson J made clear that the court should not 
‘be drawn into theorising’ but rather should be presented with available treatment options.54 
                                                                                                                                                        
EWCOP 13, [54] per Peter Jackson J; Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016] EWCOP 56, [11] per Hayden 
J. 
48
 [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP). 
49
 Ibid [72], [90]. 
50
 Ibid [137], per Peter Jackson J. 
51
 Ibid [128]. 
52
 A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [56]. 
53
 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [135]. See discussion in Richardson G. 2013. 
Mental capacity in the shadow of suicide: What can the law do? International Journal of Law in Context. 9(1): 
87-105. 
54
 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [41]. 
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The Court of Protection is reluctant to decide hypothetical questions and proceedings are 
futile if there is no clinician willing to carry out proposed treatment.
55
 Re E is also the only 
case where continued in-patient treatment was recommended. It is quite possible that the 
following four cases were precipitated by the Re E decision.  
The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012]
56
 
In Re L, L had spent around 90% of her life as an inpatient. She was physically frail and in 
end-stage organ failure. The evidence was that feeding via naso-gastric tube would require 
sedation and ‘the likelihood of death if force-feeding were to be attempted on a chemically 
sedated basis would run at close to 100%’.57 A robust case for withdrawal of coercive 
treatment was made out on the basis that continuing treatment would lead to psychological 
distress and likely result in death.  
A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014]
58
 
X had a slightly better medical prognosis than L. Cobb J recognised that: 
The particular tragedy of the case is that there is a possibility even now that Ms X 
could live a long and happy life, but that chance is very small indeed – less than 5%. 
Moreover, I am satisfied that she does not want to die.
59
 
X’s life expectancy would be normal if she could stop drinking and resume a good diet.60 
However, alcoholism and severe liver disease posed additional risks in relation to any 
coercive re-feeding regime, which resulted in a paradox: ‘that if I were to compel treatment, I 
may (and the doctors argue strongly that I would) be doing no more than facilitating or 
accelerating the termination of her life.’61 Some of the risks associated with re-feeding flowed 
from X’s likely reaction to it. One possibility was that she would increase alcohol intake, 
another was that (if denied alcohol) she would attempt suicide. 
Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016]
62
 
                                                 
55
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56
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In W’s case, the objections to re-feeding under sedation focussed less on the chances that W 
would not survive the intervention and more on the ethical dilemmas inherent in a coercive 
regime: 
The first proposal was for W to be re-fed under sedation. This would involve her 
being rendered unconscious for up to 6 months and fed by tube until she gained a 
BMI of 17.5. This proposal has not been pursued, rightly in my view. It is an 
unprecedented step and there were numerous potential objections about its ethical 
basis, W's objections, the unavailability of clinicians to carry it out, and the 
improbability that it would bring about sustainable change.
63
 
Recall that Peter Jackson J also presided in the case of E where it was accepted that: 
She would be stabilised and fed with calorific material via a naso-gastric tube or a 
PEG tube inserted through her stomach wall. Any resistance would be overcome by 
physical restraint or by chemical sedation. The process would continue for a year or 
more.
64
 
Clearly refeeding under sedation is not itself ‘unprecedented’.65 The key difference between 
Re E and Re W for Peter Jackson J was that for W all available treatment options in a wide 
range of treatment settings had been tried to no avail.
66
 In E’s case, conversely, the evidence 
was that treatment options were not exhausted. Treatment could not at that point be 
considered futile.
67
 
Re W concerns clinical futility of a different nature to Re L and Re X. It was enough in Re W 
that W’s Anorexia Nervosa was severe, unremitting and enduring. These factors indicated 
that a cure could not be hoped for.
68
 Re W is thus the closest indication that the courts might 
be amenable to the views that severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa can potentially be 
considered terminal, compulsory treatment may be futile, and palliative management may be 
clinically appropriate. 
                                                 
63
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Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016].
69
  
The risks of harm from a coercive re-feeding regime were considerable in Z’s case, though 
the evidence that it could lead to death was weaker than in L and X’s cases. The court 
differentiated between physical and chemical restraint, which posed different psychological 
and physical risks. Because Z had osteoporosis, physical restraint would probably result in 
musculoskeletal injury.
70
 Chemical sedation posed a ‘"very high risk" of respiratory or 
cardiac arrest as well as the risk that the sedation option could lead to some other iatrogenic 
cause of death’.  
The next sections outline risks that flow from the potential interpretations of this series of 
cases. One is that clinicians might rely on the outcome of the cases without due consideration 
of the nuanced consideration by each judge of the individual facts. This could potentially lead 
to an assumption of incapacity in cases of Anorexia Nervosa, and, conversely, to overreliance 
on the stated preferences of the patient when considering best interests. In future cases, it is 
argued that more could be done to protect Ps’ rights, will and preferences.  
Can patients with Anorexia Nervosa have mental capacity? 
To understand the potential in practice for patients with Anorexia Nervosa to be assumed to 
lack capacity we must first turn to the principles governing the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA) framework, helpfully articulated by Peter Jackson J in Re E
71
 in the following terms: 
People with capacity are entitled to make decisions for themselves, including about 
what they will and will not eat, even if their decision brings about their death. The 
state, here in the form of the Court of Protection, is only entitled to interfere where a 
person does not have the capacity to decide for herself. 
By contrast, where a person lacks capacity, there is a duty to make the decision that is 
in her best interests. 
The first question therefore is whether the person has capacity. The second, which can 
only arise if she does not, is what decision is in her best interests. 
In all five cases, the court found that P lacked capacity. Anorexia Nervosa constitutes an 
‘impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ so as to satisfy section 
2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act test. Section 3(1) sets out the second stage of the two-part 
test: 
                                                 
69
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For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he 
is unable— 
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means). 
In assessing P’s capacity, the court is interested not only in the patient’s understanding but 
also the ability to use and weigh the information. The MCA Code recognises that section 
3(1)(c) concerning the ability to use and weigh information may be particularly pertinent to 
patients with Anorexia Nervosa.
72
 X was found to be unable to use and weigh the information 
relating to her Anorexia Nervosa, though she retained capacity in relation to her decision to 
imbibe alcohol.
73
 The evidence was that she could understand the information needed to 
make decisions about alcohol but not about food.  
Two concerns about the capacity assessment of patients with Anorexia Nervosa are these: 
First, there is an assumption of incapacity in the terms of the declaration sought. In Re X, for 
example, the Trust sought a declaration that it is not in X’s best interests to subject her to 
treatment that may prolong her life by compulsorily detaining and treating her against her 
wishes. This limited the scope of the court to assess capacity, not because they could not 
refute the Trust’s conclusion regarding capacity, but because it framed the decision with 
respect to which capacity is assessed, as one relating to refusal of nutrition. The second 
concern is articulated by Wang who argues that the application of the MCA in Re X is 
incompatible with the CRPD.
74
 If the decision was characterised as one to choose a shorter 
life of better quality and a possibility of full recovery rather than simply as a refusal of re-
feeding, then P might, depending on their ability to understand use and weigh these issues, 
retain capacity. The narrow focus prevented X from judging whether quality or duration of 
life was more important. The specific decision subject to an assessment of capacity was not 
necessarily whether to refuse or accept nutrition, but whether to refuse or accept treatment 
that X considered futile.  
To focus on the narrow conception of P’s refusal of treatment is, I would suggest, contrary to 
the position taken in the UK Supreme Court decision of Montgomery, which focused on P’s 
                                                 
72
 MCA, Code of Practice, 4.22. 
73
 X NHS Trust v T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam), [28] –[30]. 
74
 Wang DWL. 2015. Mental Capacity Act, Anorexia Nervosa and the choice between life-prolonging treatment 
and palliative care: A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X. Modern Law Review. 78(5); 871-882. 
14 
 
entitlement to choose between relevant options
75
 ‘so that [P] is then in a position to make an 
informed decision’.76 In the words of Lady Hale: 
Most decisions about medical care are not simple yes/no answers. There are choices 
to be made, arguments for and against each of the options to be considered, and 
sufficient information must be given so that this can be done.
77
  
The decision around treatment for SEAN is not simply a matter of saying yes or no to 
nutrition and neither should the assessment of capacity be confined to this issue.  
Can patients with Anorexia Nervosa give capacitous reasons for 
refusing treatment? 
The last section argued that there are circumstances where the ‘decision’ about which 
capacity is assessed should be the broader decision about quality and duration of life rather 
than the narrow issue of nutrition. If so, it might still be argued that the broader decision is 
strongly influenced by the Anorexia Nervosa in which case it is important to ascertain 
whether there are sufficient capacitous reasons provided for the treatment refusal. 
There is authority for the proposition that a distinction should be drawn between cases where 
P cannot make a decision and those where P’s views are based in part on rational 
considerations. In Re SB
78
 a 37-year-old woman with bipolar disorder was detained under 
section 2 of the MHA. Holman J held that, contrary to expert opinion, she retained capacity 
to decide to terminate her pregnancy at 23 weeks’ gestation. Experts agreed that she 
understood what a termination entailed but was basing the decision on ‘flawed evidence and 
paranoid beliefs’.79 The evidence was that she wanted the baby until the point at which she 
came off medication (probably to protect the baby) and was beset with paranoid thoughts. 
Her family considered the decision unwise, but Holman J made clear that, applying section 
1(4) of the MCA, an unwise decision cannot be equated with an incapacitous decision. 
Holman J recognised that the views of experts are usually decisive: ‘But those are generally 
cases in which the patient himself or herself is not positively and strongly asserting, and 
actually giving evidence, that he or she has the required capacity.’80 SB was not ‘unable to 
make a decision’. The experts asserted that she could not ‘use or weigh’ the information or 
process the consequences of the decision in accordance with section 3(4). But SB gave 
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rational reasons for wanting an abortion that were not related to her paranoia: she did not 
want to have a child in detention or to have a child just to give it up for adoption.
81
  
Can rational reasons be given for refusing treatment for Anorexia Nervosa? Ambivalence is a 
feature of Anorexia Nervosa, with patients typically valuing the disorder and wishing to keep 
it, despite suffering and evidence of harm if they do not accept treatment.
82
 Furthermore, a 
challenge with severe Anorexia Nervosa is that patients are typically articulate, yet may have 
difficulties in separating an authentic self as opposed to a self which is inextricably entwined 
with the values, wishes and desires of Anorexia Nervosa. The attachment to Anorexia 
Nervosa can be so strong that patients may prefer to die than to gain weight, or value the 
disorder more than life itself. As a result, it is important to examine carefully what 
motivations and reasoning underpin P’s expressed wish to live or to die. Thus, the question of 
whether P’s will to die flows from a sense of hopelessness and a desire to end the struggle or 
alternatively from an articulated preference to die rather than gain weight, is relevant when 
considering P’s ability to use and weigh information.  
There are parallels between Re SB and X, who also ‘made a decision’. Whilst X’s perception 
of her body image and weight were irrational, it is arguable that she also gave rational 
reasons for wanting to avoid further compulsion: X set out her views in writing, stating that 
the therapy was making her worse and: ‘Whatever time I have left I just want to live each day 
alongside my granddad and [siblings], who are my world.’83 In a recent US case, Superior 
Court Judge Paul Armstrong ruled that AG, a 29-year-old woman with severe Anorexia 
Nervosa, could not be treated against her capacitous decision to refuse food.
84
 The divisional 
court had, in an earlier case, held that she lacked capacity and a Guardian was appointed. In 
2014 AG had been treated against her will and suffered heart failure because of re-feeding 
syndrome. Her Guardian argued that palliative care was appropriate and AG’s parents agreed. 
Tube-feeding would likely result in musculoskeletal injury due to osteoporosis. The state 
opposed the request because it would constitute passive euthanasia. As in X’s case, AG 
understood that non-treatment could result in her death. The Court held that her testimony 
was ‘forthright, responsive, knowing, intelligent, voluntary, steadfast and credible’.85 AG 
retained capacity and, in accordance with her wishes, she was transferred to a palliative care 
unit. 
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Based on the five decisions from England and Wales, it is difficult to conceive of a case 
where someone with severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa would be considered capacitous 
in relation to decisions to refuse food. Peter Jackson J recognised that E was in a Catch 22 
situation: ‘by deciding not to eat, she proves that she lacks capacity to decide at all.’86 It 
seems that, by focusing the question on P’s ability to make decisions about nutrition, we stray 
very close to a presumption of incapacity. We would respectfully recommend that in future 
cases a patient-centred position is used to frame the decision which is subject to a capacity 
assessment. Even if the patient cannot make a capacitous decision about nutrition, they may 
be able to provide rational reasons for refusing treatment for Anorexia Nervosa. In such 
cases, clinicians or the court might accept that the patient can make a capacitous decision to 
do so. 
Parallels with assisted dying 
As a brief but relevant aside, it is worth noting that questions over the authenticity of 
treatment decisions made by those with mental disorder are not limited to Anorexia Nervosa. 
There are parallels with debates around assisted dying. There is evidence of mounting 
acceptance of the right to assisted suicide, both in the UK
87
 and internationally.
88
 In countries 
where assisted dying is lawful, it is often limited to terminal illness and sometimes also to 
non-terminal, untreatable diseases such as motor neuron disease. The Netherlands and 
Belgium recognise that, in principle, patients with non-somatic illness, such as clinical 
depression, are eligible for assisted dying. There are recent reports of a 20-year-old woman 
with Anorexia Nervosa accessing assisted dying in the Netherlands,
89
 and of UK patients 
with dementia dying at the Dignitas facility in Zurich.
90
 Schuklenk and van der Vathorst have 
argued that competent patients who suffer from depressive disorders that are treatment-
resistant are discriminated against if they are excluded from assistance in dying offered to 
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other groups.
91
 The battle to ascertain and uphold the will of patients with mental disorder is 
one fought on a number of fronts. 
How far are P’s views relevant to an assessment of best interests? 
Given that the courts ruled that E, L, X, W and Z lacked capacity, the decisions turned on an 
assessment of their best interests. This section sets out the test and considers the relevance of 
P’s views. Was the alignment of the decision and the views of L, X, W and Z a coincidence 
or an attempt to comply with their will and preferences? And if the latter, is this appropriate?  
Best interests cannot be defined by a single test.
92
 A balance sheet approach is often used as 
an ‘aide memoir’93 to assist in the weighing of medical and non-medical factors set out in 
section 4 of the MCA.
94
 In Aintree, Lady Hale recognised the common law presumption that 
it is in P’s best interests to stay alive.95 Whilst there are no general principles applicable to 
when the presumption might be rebutted, there has been support for a ‘touchstone of 
intolerability’96assessed by a balancing exercise. That exercise requires the decision-maker to 
consider ‘welfare in the widest sense, not just medical but social and psychological’.97 This 
requires consideration of: 
the nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of 
success; they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely 
to be; they must try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask 
what his attitude to the treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult 
others who are looking after him or interested in his welfare, in particular for their 
view of what his attitude would be.
98
 
Lady Hale was clear that whilst the test is objective: ‘The purpose of the best interests test is 
to consider matters from the patient’s point of view.’99 Where P cannot make a capacitous 
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decision, then it is necessary to make an assessment of P’s values and beliefs, wishes and 
feelings in order to make ‘the choice which is right for him as an individual human being’.100  
This position brings the law closer to compliance with the UN CRPD. Article 12(4) views 
respect for P’s rights, will and preferences as an integral part of equal recognition before the 
law. In 2017, the Law Commission recommended that P’s wishes and feelings should be 
ascertained and given weight,
101
 and departed from only if necessary and proportionate.
102
  
In the five cases, P’s wishes are central to the analysis of best interests and, in each case, P 
consistently and articulately stated a wish to avoid compulsory re-feeding. In Re E Peter 
Jackson J said: 
I agree … that particular respect is due to the wishes and feelings of someone who, 
although lacking capacity, is as fully and articulately engaged as E.
103
 
In Z’s case, voluntary treatment was said to have the best hope of preserving Z’s 
autonomy.
104
 In each case, credence was given to P’s views and in principle this is to be 
celebrated. In Briggs v Briggs, Charles J said: 
if the decision that P would have made, and so their wishes on such an intensely 
personal issue can be ascertained with sufficient certainty it should generally prevail 
over the very strong presumption in favour of preserving life.
105
 
However, Charles J also recognised that the best interests determination is fact sensitive and 
exceptions may apply, for example, where P has previously made harmful decisions which 
the court would be reluctant to make on P’s behalf; where P’s current expression of their 
wishes (such as a desire to leave hospital) fails to factor in or weigh competing factors; and 
where clinical conditions and their effect impact on P’s decision-making.106 These factors are 
highly relevant to the SEAN cases. Anorexia Nervosa can undermine autonomy in several 
ways,
107
 and, though ‘will’ and ‘preferences’ are often conflated,108 the SEAN cases serve as 
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a powerful illustration of how the two might clash. There may, for example, be a stated 
preference (not to eat) that conflicts with an authentic will (to live); a current preference that 
conflicts with a past preference; or the Anorexia Nervosa might itself influence or generate a 
willingness to die (though not usually a wish to die) that flows from the desire to be thin, in 
which case P’s ‘rights’ may conflict with both P’s will and preferences.  
Coggon persuasively argues that, where possible, the same weight should be given to P’s 
wishes and feelings when P lacks capacity as when P retains it.
109
 The MCA requires by 
section 4(6) that consideration is given, as far as is reasonably ascertainable,
110
 to P’s past 
and present wishes and feelings, beliefs and values. As Coggon acknowledges, difficulties 
arise where P has expressed conflicting views. Does a past capacitous view take precedence 
over a current incapacitous view? Section 4 of the MCA gives little guidance as to how to 
deal with conflict between past and present wishes. In SEAN cases, it may not be clear that P 
ever had the relevant insight into their condition to make a capacitous decision about 
nutrition. There was some acknowledgment of this in Z’s case: Having considered the 
‘broader canvass’ of Z’s life,111 Hayden J concluded: ‘Sadly, in this case that has proved to be 
a very short exercise. Z's world, since she was 15 years of age, has been entirely 
circumscribed by her eating disorder.’112  
Analysing Re Z, Clough persuasively argues that will and preferences go beyond a mere 
consideration of the issue of nutrition.
113
 As we have seen, all five patients wanted to avoid a 
coercive regime, but whilst E and X wanted to be allowed to die with dignity
114
 L, W and Z 
expressed a hope and desire to live. L felt that if funding were secured to enable her to move 
to a nursing home, she would survive.
115
 W wanted to return to education and pursue a 
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career.
116
 Z believed that, if allowed to return home, she would survive.
117
 Given the 
conflicting nature of the desire to live and the desire to avoid compulsory re-feeding, it is 
unclear in L, W and Z’s cases which should take priority.  
Just as we have argued that the capacity assessment should look beyond the narrow issue of 
nutrition, so too, where P lacks capacity, the best interests assessment should extend beyond 
that narrow focus. The danger inherent in the 5 cases is twofold. First it is not clear that a 
sufficiently nuanced consideration of best interests was undertaken. Second, it is possible that 
the cases will be misconstrued in practice and that patients shown (or assumed) to lack 
capacity will nonetheless be given the choice to refuse treatment. Unless a suitably nuanced 
consideration of will and preferences is undertaken, there is potential in clinical practice to 
assume that the stated preferences of the patient represent their best interests where, in some 
cases, in-patient treatment might still be appropriate and potentially efficacious.  
Treatment utility and futility 
In England and Wales, the issue of treatment efficacy influences clinicians’ choices between 
two different but overlapping legal regimes: The Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Mental 
Health Act 1983.  
Mental Health Act 
As we have seen, in-patient treatment under the MHA 1983 does not necessarily require 
patient consent. A minimum requirement is that the treatment does not violate Article 3 of the 
ECHR that prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. Compulsory treatment violates Article 
3 unless it is shown to be in P’s best interests on the basis that a ‘medical necessity has been 
convincingly shown to exist’.118 In R(N) v (M) the test for necessity was said to include: 
(a) how certain is it that the patient does suffer from a treatable mental disorder; (b) 
how serious a disorder is it; (c) how serious a risk is presented to others; (d) how 
likely is it that, if the patient does suffer from such a disorder, the proposed treatment 
will alleviate the condition; (e) how much alleviation is there likely to be; (f) how 
likely is it that the treatment will have adverse consequences for the patient; and (g) 
how severe may they be.
 119
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Where the treatment decision is made by clinicians under the MHA framework, the first 
factor listed in R (N) v (M) is affected by the revision of the MHA in 2007, replacing the 
requirement of treatability with one of ‘appropriate’ treatment.120 This affords clinicians 
significant discretion which, in the case of SEAN, would be much ameliorated by the 
provision of a practical framework. If it is accepted, as seems to be the case in the American 
case of AG, discussed above, that Anorexia Nervosa can be defined as a ‘late terminal’ 
condition, then compulsory treatment in some cases of SEAN could be considered futile. On 
the other hand, clinicians who consider the disorder to be a chronic condition might see value 
in continued treatment. The MHA Code of Practice recognises that for some patients, 
management rather than cure is ‘all that can be hoped for’.121 In common with many mental 
disorders, eating disorders cannot always be cured and the diagnosis may be life-long. 
Mental Capacity Act: Cure or management? 
In Briggs, Charles J recognised that P’s views might not be followed if P wants something 
that ‘is not an available option’.122 In the five SEAN cases, P was not requesting but refusing 
treatment. Still, the perceived utility or futility of the treatment options is pertinent: A refusal 
of something that would not be offered needs little by way of justification. The right to life 
enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR is not absolute
123
 and the best interests test goes wider 
than medical necessity
124
 to encompass the value of treatment.
125
 In Aintree, Lady Hale made 
clear that futility must be assessed against the wide interests of the patient; treatment is not 
futile if it brings benefit to the patient, even if it does not improve the underlying medical 
condition.
126
  
Unfortunately, there is dicta in the cases that suggests a more limited view of the purpose of 
treatment. When combined with a narrow focus on P’s expressed views, the judgments form 
a powerful incentive for clinicians to release objecting SEAN patients from in-patient 
treatment programmes. The dicta in question focusses on cure as the purpose of treatment. In 
W’s case it was said that interventions had for some time merely kept her alive rather than 
addressed the underlying condition.
127
 To keep her on the unit or move her to another unit 
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was considered cruel given the restrictions it would involve and the remoteness of any 
prospects for change.
128
 In X’s case, too, it was established that the purpose of re-feeding was 
not simply to avert the risk of death, but rather to treat the underlying conditions. The purpose 
was for X: 
i) to gain weight,  
ii) more importantly to gain insight into the benefits of psychotherapeutic 
interventions to address the causes of her illnesses, and then  
iii) yet more crucially still, to avail herself of those psychotherapeutic interventions.129 
The conclusion in X’s case was that: ‘Any re-feeding treatment would not now, as it never 
has, address the cause of the Anorexia Nervosa; it would merely serve to prolong life’.130 In 
Z’s case, the judge concluded that discharge from the MHA framework and treatment on a 
voluntary basis ‘is ultimately the only proposal which carries any vestige of hope and most 
effectively preserves Z's dignity and autonomy’.131 
Contrary to this view, Lady Hale asserted in Aintree that: ‘[I]t is setting the goal too high to 
say that treatment is futile unless it has ‘a real prospect of curing or at least palliating the life-
threatening disease or illness from which the patient is suffering’.’132 The cases of W and Z 
post-date Aintree. Coggon argues that the concept of the treatment decision needs further 
evaluation.
133
 We would submit that by reframing the decision against which capacity is 
assessed to encompass P’s decision around the value of further treatment, not only might 
some SEAN patients be found to have capacity, but even where they do not, it would 
encourage assessment of whether a short- or long-term view of the purpose of treatment is 
relevant to P. A short-term view may be relevant in cases where the prognosis is poor, but 
prolonged life coincides with the patient’s will or values.134 It might also be relevant in a 
SEAN case if there is evidence that re-feeding could enhance capacity (by reducing the 
adverse effects of physical frailty or sedative drugs); or that re-feeding might lead to a more 
positive engagement with services, family or education, even if the evidence suggests that P 
might later relapse. However, if P’s capacity to make a decision about the value of continued 
treatment is not assessed, then P’s opportunity to influence the outcome is limited both in the 
assessment of capacity and in the determination of best interests, where the bar for futility is 
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lowered by the long-term view of the purpose of treatment. The closer we come to assessing 
futility of treatment options against the goal of complete cure, the easier it will be to 
demonstrate. This may be failing P if it coincides with their stated preference but not their 
will or values and their desire to live. 
Conclusion 
The judges in the decisions of E, L, X, W, and Z carefully and compassionately considered 
the patients’ wishes. In four of the cases they granted the declarations sought by the Trusts to 
cease compulsory treatment in compliance with the wishes of P, with the support of P’s 
family and clinicians.  
This paper has focussed on the potential effects of the judgments in clinical practice. But it is 
important to acknowledge that the judges operated under several constraints. First, they were 
limited by the options put to them by the clinical team. There is no general power to decide 
how clinicians should treat a patient.
135
 Second, the strong presumption in favour of life is 
countered by the legal question focusing not on ‘should the patient be allowed to die?’ but 
‘should invasive and non-consensual medical care continue?’.136 Third, the courts were 
powerless to affect the timing of the decisions. Trusts are advised to bring a claim only once a 
structured assessment has taken place,
137
 but by the time the cases of E, L, X, W and Z came 
to court, the condition of each of the patients was dire.
138
 Finally, the question of resources is 
an ever-present undercurrent.
139
 NICE guidance makes clear that ‘eating disorders, in 
particular Anorexia Nervosa, result in substantial economic burden on the healthcare 
resources’.140 Clinicians must consider the resource implications of on-going treatment, just 
as treatment availability or lack thereof
141
 may have contributed to the severe and enduring 
nature of the condition now suffered by the patient.  
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Operating within these constraints, it may yet be possible in future cases to subject a clinical 
view that P lacks capacity to greater scrutiny. This would allow judges to enhance protection 
of P’s autonomy rights and to provide valuable practical guidance for clinicians. In light of 
our analysis, we have made three principal recommendations: 
(1) The court should resist appointing the same expert in all cases. In a clinical setting, a 
plurality of views exists on the prognosis of patients with SEAN; their capacity; the 
choice between Mental Capacity Act or Mental Health Act regimes; and ultimately on 
their best interests. Understood as a potentially terminal condition, the focus might be 
on when to stop treatment and focus on palliative management. Understood as a 
treatable or indeed chronic condition, the focus will be on refusal of re-feeding in 
which case, even if capacitous, P’s refusal might be overruled under the MHA 
framework on the basis that appropriate treatment and prospect of recovery or 
continued life with reasonable quality exists.  
(2) A patient-centred assessment of capacity will flexibly interpret the decision about 
which capacity is assessed by reference to the patient’s views on the value of 
treatment. A patient who lacks capacity to make a decision about nutrition may have 
capacity to determine that treatment is no longer worthwhile. 
(3) Where it is found that P lacks capacity, and the Court of Protection is asked to 
determine best interests, the Court should seek to identify P’s views, contrasting 
current and past views; rights, will and preferences. Exclusive focus on P’s expressed 
views on re-feeding risks reliance on stated preferences that can potentially clash with 
P’s will (as, for example when P refuses food but desires to live). This is particularly 
troublesome when P’s (unauthentic) views of futility coincide with a clinical view that 
treatment of SEAN has become futile, or with a judicial assessment of the 
appropriateness of treatment against the goal of cure rather than management of the 
disorder. Where P expresses views about the value and purpose of treatment these 
views are relevant to the best interests assessment. Where they constitute an authentic 
expression of P’s will, they will guide clinicians and the court in determining best 
interests from P’s point of view.142 
Though the judgments do not promote such a broad-brush approach, a focus on the outcomes 
of the five cases in combination might lead to an assumption in clinical practice that P cannot 
make a capacitous decision in relation to the treatment of Anorexia Nervosa, and, where a 
lengthy programme of intervention has not addressed the underlying condition, that further 
compulsory treatment might be considered futile. This can and should be avoided. Palliative 
management should be based on need rather than diagnosis; capacity should be decision- and 
not disease-specific.  
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